Two Vice Presidents of a Bank Face "Heavy Sentences for Small Bribes," Exposing Hidden Reasons

Illustration: Image shows the entrance of a China Construction Bank branch in a certain city. (Video screenshot)

[People News] The recent heavy sentencing of two vice presidents from the China Development Bank (CDB) has drawn public attention. Yesterday (November 5), former CDB vice president Zhou Qingyu was sentenced to 15 years by the Changchun Intermediate People's Court in Jilin Province, while another vice president, Wang Yongsheng, was sentenced to 12 years by the Jilin City Intermediate People's Court about two weeks ago. Both were also members of the bank's Party committee. What’s noteworthy is that their bribe amounts were relatively small, with Zhou accused of accepting more than 68.43 million yuan (RMB, hereafter), and Wang over 23.51 million yuan—amounts considered relatively low yet paired with unusually harsh sentences.

The amounts of 68.43 million and 23.51 million yuan make these officials look almost "clean" compared to some high-profile "tigers" like Fan Jixiang, former deputy secretary and chairman of China Power Construction Corporation, with his 970 billion yuan in illicit gains, or former vice president of the People's Bank of China Fan Yifei, who amassed 800 billion yuan. But many who committed grand-scale corruption have received sentences of just a decade or even less. For instance, former Zhejiang Department of Construction deputy director Yang Xiuzhu embezzled 253.2 million yuan and only received an eight-year sentence. Liu Linxiang, former director of the budget office of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, misappropriated nearly 400 million yuan and was sentenced to only ten years. Gao Shan, former director of the Harbin He Song Street branch of the Bank of China, embezzled 1 billion yuan but received just 15 years. Former Fujian Province Vice Governor Zhang Zhinan was convicted of accepting bribes and abusing power totaling 182.32 million yuan and received only a 14-year sentence. Inner Mongolia's former vice chairman Bai Xiangqun embezzled 132 million yuan and was sentenced to 16 years, while former secretary of the Jilin City Political Consultative Conference Party group and chairman Cui Zhenji was sentenced to 20 years for corruption and bribery totaling 130 million yuan.

Some cases even disappear without a conclusion. For example, Yang Sitang, former secretary of the CCP Hainan Provincial Agricultural Reclamation Investment Holding Group and former director of the Hainan Provincial Agricultural Reclamation Bureau, took bribes totaling 338 million yuan, but there was no final sentence. Similarly, Wei Chuanzhong, former deputy director of the National Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine Administration, accepted 12.323 million yuan in bribes without any judicial conclusion. Hu Zhiqiang, former party secretary of Yulin and director of the standing committee of the municipal people’s congress, was involved in cases exceeding 100 million yuan, yet nothing conclusive emerged.

In comparison, Zhou Qingyu and Wang Yongsheng’s amounts seem almost trivial, but they received harsher sentences, possibly prompting feelings of injustice among others in the Party who may feel unfairly treated.

According to public records, Zhou worked in the financial system for an extended period. In 2011, he joined CDB as the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission and from 2016 to July 2022, he served as a vice president. Thus, Zhou was a knowledgeable official who oversaw legal compliance among other officials.

The CCP’s local courts now accuse Zhou of engaging in "power-for-money" transactions over the past decade, allegedly leveraging his residual influence even after leaving office by colluding with "other state officials" in power-for-money transactions. Notably, the term "other state officials" indicates that Zhou’s case may involve other officials. Zhou may have exposed these individuals, or he may have been implicated by others in related cases.

Who might these other officials be? In recent years, several CDB executives have fallen from grace. For example, on March 13 this year, former vice president Li Jiping was publicly announced to have been investigated eight years after his retirement. On January 12, Zhang Chi, former head of CDB's Jilin branch, was also placed under investigation. In July 2023, former vice president Wang Yongsheng was investigated, as was then-vice president He Xingxiang in September 2021, former chairman Hu Huaibang in July 2019, and former supervisory board chairman Yao Zhongmin in June 2016.

Founded in 1994, CDB is a state-owned development finance institution directly under the leadership of the CCP State Council, with extensive and deep-rooted connections in financial circles. Some of the above personnel may have been implicated by Zhou’s case, leading to mutual accusations within the financial system but limited to the finance sector, so as not to implicate officials in the State Council. Hence, a heavy sentence serves to "protect" him by keeping him in prison and preventing any further revelations.

It’s worth mentioning that Wang Yongsheng, the other vice president sentenced two weeks before Zhou, was accused by the court of engaging in power-for-money transactions from 2010 to 2019. Since Wang truthfully confessed his crimes after surrendering and disclosed facts not yet known by the supervisory authorities, his sentence was comparatively lighter. Wang, also a veteran in finance, had served as CDB vice president since 2011. The official statement emphasizes that he confessed facts unknown to the supervisory authorities, possibly suggesting that he implicated others, with Zhou likely being one of them, given that Zhou’s sentencing closely followed Wang’s. But receiving 12 years could still be considered light, reflecting unfairness in the CCP system.

Why, then, were Zhou and Wang given heavy sentences for "small bribes"? Besides protecting other officials and lacking strong political backing, the CCP under Xi may be looking to purge the financial system. Since a financial coup nearly destabilized the stock market ten years ago, Xi’s CCP has taken steps to seize financial power, including apprehending "white gloves" like Xiao Jianhua and Wang Qishan's associate Fan Yifei. Yet full control over finances has not been secured, nor has the "money bag" been entirely taken. Hence, a strong warning must be sent to those still destabilizing the financial markets. Even officials claiming to represent the "proletariat" shouldn’t grow greedy for millions.

Naturally, the CCP has numerous ways to funnel funds, like healthcare service fees, official reception expenses, inspection expenses, and equipment procurement fees for investment promotion. Others’ embezzlement is considered "legal" and can be "handled with discretion," while financial "tigers" are dealt with as harshly as winter. How could Zhou and Wang possibly accept this treatment without resentment?